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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIMITATIONS IMPOSED
ON TRADITIONAL USE OF DOCTRINE OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
The Supreme Court held that federal judicial abstention may be
inappropriate where violation of first amendment rights results
from threatened state criminal proceedings brought under vague
statutes or where bad faith prosecutions give rise to a claim under
the Civil Rights Act. In order to provide immediate federal court
protection in either of these situations, the Court has had to further
erode the traditional policy bases underlying the doctrine of ab-
stention.
U NDER THE traditional doctrine of abstention, federal courts
have refused to enjoin the enforcement of state criminal statutes,
even where the alleged violation of a federal constitutional right is
involved, unless there is a clear "showing of danger of irreparable
injury 'both great and immediate.' "1 In the recent decision of
Dombrowski v. Pfister,2 the Supreme Court has limited the use of
abstention3 by expanding the meaning of "irreparable injury" in
order to make available immediate federal court protection in two
situations. Thus, abstention may be improper where first amend-
ment rights are subjected to the "chilling effects" of vague state
statutes, or where activities are protected from the harassment of
threatened or actual state prosecutions instituted in bad faith
giving rise to a claim under the Civil Rights Act.4
Dombrowski and other members of the Southern Conference
Educational Fund (SCEF), a civil rights organization, had been
threatened with state prosecution for violating several Louisiana
statutes which imposed penalties for participating in the formation,
management, or support of a subversive organization5 and for fail-
' Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943).
2 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (five to two decision).
3 The specific strictures imposed on the use of abstention do not clearly emerge
from the opinion. Disagreement over the interpretation of the decision is illustrated
in a subsequent Supreme Court case, Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742, 754
(1965) (per curiam) (dissenting opinions). See notes 53-54 infra and accompanying
text.
'REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
"It shall be a felony for any person knowingly and wilfully to . . . assist in the
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ing to register as an official of a "Communist-front organization."
They applied to the federal district court for declaratory relief and
an injunction to restrain state officials from prosecuting or threaten-
ing to prosecute under these and other statutes.7
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court
to abstain and dismiss." The Court reasoned that where a peti-
tioner interposes a nonfrivolous allegation that a state statute is so
vague that it is void on its face, the restraint upon the exercise of
first amendment rights that ensues from the application of the statute
constitutes sufficient irreparable injury to waive application of the
formation or participate in the management or to contribute to the support of any
subversive organization .... ." LA. REv. STAT. § 14:64(4) (Supp. 1962), quoted in
380 U.S. at 493 n.9. This section incorporates therein the definition of subversive or-
ganization found in LA. REv. STAT. § 14:359 (5) (Supp. 1962), where the term is defined
as "any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches, or a pur-
pose of which is to engage in or advocate, abet, advise, or teach activities intended to
overthrow, destroy, or to assist in the overthrow or destruction of the constitutional
form of the government of the state of Louisiana, . . . by revolution, force, violence or
other unlawful means .... " 380 U.S. at 493-94 n.10.
I LA. REv. STAT. § 14:364 (7) (Supp. 1962), quoted in 380 U.S. at 492 n.7 imposed a
penalty for failure to register as a member of a communist-front organization as
defined by LA. REv. STAT. § 14:359 (3) (Supp. 1962), quoted in 380 U.S. at 494-95 n.ll.
' The SCEF officers alleged that the statutes were void on their face as violative of
their first and fourteenth amendment rights of freedom of expression. They also
invoked the Civil Rights Act, Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), by
alleging that the threats to enforce the subversion statutes were not made for the
purpose of securing valid convictions, but rather were made in bad faith as part of
a plan to harass and discourage the civil rights activities of the organization. 380
U.S. at 482.
In October, 1963, the individual appellants had been arrested and charged with
violation of the statutes, and "at gunpoint their homes and offices were raided and
ransacked by police officers .... A truckload of files, membership lists, subscription
lists to SCEF's newspaper, correspondence, and records were removed from SCEF's
office, destroying its capacity to function." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556,
573 (E.D. La. 1964) (dissenting opinion). A state court judge quashed the arrest war-
rants because they were not based on probable cause and granted a motion to suppress
the seized evidence on the grounds that the raid was illegal. The action in the Federal
District Court was filed in November, 1963, after threats by state officials to enforce the
statutes continued. In fact, after the District Court had dismissed SCEF's action,
a state grand jury returned indictments against the individual officers and their prose-
cution awaited the outcome of the appeal to the United States Supreme Court from
the District Court decision to abstain. 380 U.S. at 488 & n.5.
" The District Court had dismissed the complaint, one judge dissenting, "for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 227 F. Supp. at 564. The
court found no irreparable injury warranting interference with imminent state criminal
proceedings. Abstention was deemed appropriate because possible narrowing con-
struction of the statutes in question by the state courts would avoid unnecessary
adjudication of constitutional questions. To enjoin enforcement of statutes involving
the state's "basic right of self-preservation . . . would be a massive emasculation of
the last vestige of the dignity of sovereignty." Id. at 559.
9 Where prosecutions are threatened under a statute challenged as an unduly
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abstention doctrine.9 The Court apparently reasoned that absten-
tion is equally inappropriate where the complaint alleges bad faith
prosecutions by state officials in violation of the Civil Rights Act.
Thus, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court, holding
the statutory provisions to be void on their face' and ordering the
lower court to fashion appropriate injunctive and declaratory re-
lief."1
Abstention was first applied by the Supreme Court 2 in order
vague regulation of expression, "this challenge, if not dearly frivolous, will establish
the threat of irreparable injury required by traditional doctrines of equity." 380 U.S.
at 490.
IOLA. REv. STAT. § 14:364 (7) (Supp. 1962), which required registration of members
in communist-front organizations, was held void on its face since the procedure for
classification of a group as a communist-front organization, LA. REV. STAT. § 14:359(3)
(Supp. 1962), did not afford them the safeguards of procedural due process demanded
by the Court in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
380 U.S. at 495-96.
LA. REv. STAT. § 14:364 (4) (Supp. 1962), which makes it a felony to form, manage
or support a subversive organization, was also held invalid, as it incorporated a defi-
nition of "subversive organization" (found in LA. REv. STAT. § 14:359 (5) (Supp. 1962))
which was substantially identical to the definition declared invalid in Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 362, 363 n.1 (1964). 380 U.S. at 494. The Court in Baggett held
that the definition was so vague as to transgress the due process requirement and fur-
ther found that the unconstitutional vagueness operated to inhibit the exercise of first
amendment rights. Baggett v. Bullitt, supra at 372.
11380 U.S. at 497. "In addition, appellants are entitled to expeditious determina-
tion, without abstention, of the remaining issues raised in the complaint." Id. at 498.
The members of SCEF also alleged that their files and records had been illegally
seized under color of the Communist Propaganda Control Law, LA. Rav. STAT. §§
14:390-14:390.8 (Supp. 1962). The Court decided that "in light of the uncertain
state of the record, however, we believe that the appellants' attacks upon the consti-
tutionality, on its face and as applied, of the Communist Propaganda Control Law
should await determination by the District Court after considering the sufficiency of
threats to enforce the law." Id. at 496 n.13.
The Supreme Court also remanded to the District Court the issue of the claim
stated under the Civil Rights Act, abstention being deemed as inappropriate to that
claim "as on the issues we here decide." Id. at 497.
"aRailroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The doctrine apparently arose in response to the ramifications of the landmark
case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 n.1 (1959).
The Supreme Court there held that a federal injunction of state prosecutions would
be proper where state officials "threaten and are about to commence proceedings,
either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconsti-
tutional act, violating the Federal Constitution." Ex parte Young, supra at 156.
In order to avoid the possible federal interference with state administration of its
law suggested by the Ex parte Young decision, the federal court will defer action on a
suit properly before it until the state court has been given a reasonable opportunity
to pass upon state enactments. Such use of the federal court's equitable power "is a
contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and
federal authority." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra at 501.
See generally 1 BARRON & HOLrZOEF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 64 (1960);
Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
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to avoid premature or unnecessary constitutional adjudication 8
and to further the principle of judicial comity.' 4 Congress has, in
fact, sought to give limited statutory effect to the doctrine by pro-
viding that a federal court may not enjoin a criminal proceeding al-
ready commenced in a state court.15 Where no state criminal pro-
ceeding has commenced, however, the federal courts will exercise
their discretion and refrain from intervening unless exceptional
circumstances require adjudication to prevent irreparable injury
"both great and immediate."' 6 To avert abstention, the petitioner
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37
TExAs L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1959); Comment, 1965 DuKE
LJ. 102; Note, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 226 (1959).
I' Resolution of a state law issue might eliminate the necessity of federal consti-
tutional adjudication which "touches a sensitive area of social policy." Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra note 12, at 498. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), for a discussion of the policy of avoiding con.
stitutional adjudication. The policy has generally been applied, however, without an
inquiry into whether the constitutional adjudication would have touched a "sensitive
area of social policy" in the particular case involved. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 860
U.S. 219 (1959); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Chicago
v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
1Judicial comity is a principle "which teaches that one court should defer
action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty
with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an oppor-
tunity to pass upon the matter." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
The principle of comity is peculiarly apposite where an imminent state criminal
proceeding is enjoined, since a clash between coordinate political as well as judicial
authorities is readily apparent. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951) (improper
to enjoin state criminal prosecution using unconstitutionally obtained evidence). More-
over, if the state proceeding has commenced, the practical effect of intervention is to
"expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption" for "every
question of procedural due process of law . . .would invite a flanking movement
against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum." Id. at 123.
15 "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1964).
The Supreme Court has granted injunctions against threatened prosecutions, but
prosecutions actually pending in the state courts are distinguished on the ground
that comity does not permit interference once another court has acquired jurisdiction
over the matter. See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 453 (1927); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908). This distinction has been criticized as specious,
since the threatened proceeding may differ only formally in that the state prosecutor
has not yet filed suit. See Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 381, 386 (1952). However, an in-
junction does not interfere with "proceedings" within the meaning of § 2283 unless a
suit has been instituted in the state court. See Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 726, 728-29
(1961).
10 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1941); Spielman Motor Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935).
The federal courts should not interfere with threatened proceedings in state courts
"save in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity
to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent." Douglas v. City of
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must demonstrate that he would not receive the same protection in
a state court trial, with ultimate appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court, as he would by proceeding under the equity juris-
diction of the federal courts.17 The fact that a state statute as
applied may be repugnant to the Constitution will not ordinarily
constitute such sufficient injury.'8
Harrison v. NAACP-19 is illustrative of the traditional Supreme
Court approach in a situation where a federal court has been asked
to enjoin enforcement of a state statute alleged to be repugnant
to the United States Constitution. A federal district court in Harri-
son had refused to abstain and enjoined enforcement of Virginia
"barratry" and "registration" statutes, 20 reasoning that the statutes
were designed to limit the legal representation and lobbying activi-
ties of the NAACP in Virginia in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment.21 The Supreme Court reversed, holding abstention proper
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). In Douglas there was no threat of immediate
irreparable injury because the challenged ordinance had been invalidated by the
Court in another case, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), decided the
same day as Douglas. Although the situation here was unique, the decision has often
been cited as justifying federal abstention in the interests of comity. See, e.g.,
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 235 (1943).
Originally a court of equity had no jurisdiction over actions to stay criminal pro-
ceedings. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). Prior to clear articulation of the doctrine
of abstention, however, this restriction was relaxed in a few cases where state prose-
cutions threatened property rights or personal freedoms. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923) (dictum); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
117Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. at 164.
1 The enforcement of a statute, "even though alleged to be in violation of con-
stitutional guarantees, is not a ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or con-
stitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be
determined as readily in the criminal case as in a suit for an injunction." Id. at 163.
The decisions also indicate that the threat of injury must be more than that
"incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Id.
at 164. (Emphasis added.) This standard is reiterated by the Court in Dombrowski,
380 U.S. at 485.
-- 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
20 The barratry statute punished "the offense of stirring up litigation." VA. CoDE
ANN. §§ 18.1-388 to -393 (1960). The registration statutes required detailed annual dis-
closures to be filed with the state by persons or organizations rendering financial as-
sistance in litigation or conducting activities related to the passage of racial legislation
or advocacy of "racial integration or segregation." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-372 to .387
(1960).
21 NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958). The district court recognized
that the statutes had not been construed by the state courts but held abstention
inappropriate "where the statute is free from ambiguity and there remains no reason-
able interpretation which will render it constitutional ...." Id. at 523.
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since the statutes had not been construed by the state courts and
were subject to possible limiting construction 22 which might avoid
or materially change the nature of the federal constitutional adjudi-
cation. Thus, traditional concepts of abstention as exemplified by
Harrison require that when the state enactments are "fairly open to
interpretation," 23 federal courts should not determine their con-
stitutionality until the state courts have been afforded an oppor-
tunity to construe them in light of the federal constitutional ob-
jections.2 4 Deference to state authority is not unlimited however.
While abstention was deemed proper in Harrison, the lower federal
court was ordered to retain jurisdiction and exact assurances from
the prosecuting authorities that the statutes would not be enforced
against any conduct which might be engaged in by the NAACP
prior to the termination of the litigation.25
In the recent decision of Baggett v. Bullitt,26 however, the Su-
preme Court limited the use of the abstention doctrine. Rather than
requiring abstention whenever the state statute under attack is
"fairly open to interpretation" by a state court, the Court determined
that abstention is inappropriate wherever a vague statute may be
subject to an indefinite number of interpretations by the state
courts.27 The statutes involved in Baggett required a loyalty oath
as a condition of employment for teachers and state employees.
28
2 360 U.S. at 177. The Supreme Court suggested, for example, that the "ad-
vocacy" clause, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-381 (1960), "might be construed as reaching only
that [conduct] directed at the incitement of violence." 360 U.S. at 178.
23 Id. at 176.
2 This "serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention; and it
spares the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication." Id. at 177.
See, e.g., Government & Civic Employees Organization v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946);
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
25 360 U.S. at 179. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Dombrowski, cited the Harrison
case to support his argument that the district court should have abstained while
retaining jurisdiction "for the purpose of affording appellants appropriate relief
in the event that the state prosecution did not go forward in a prompt and bona
fide manner." 380 U.S. at 502.
26377 U.S. 360 (1964).2 7 Id. at 378.
28 Washington law requires teachers to swear, "by precept and example," to
"promote respect for the flag and institutions of the United States of America and
the State of Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the
government of the United States." Wash. Laws 1931, ch. 103, at 296.
Wash. Laws 1931, ch. 377, at 1545, requires a state employee to swear that he is
not a "subversive person," meaning one who "commits, attempts to commit, or aids
in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person
to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to over-
[V ol. 1966: 219
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In finding that administration of the statutory oath constituted
sufficient irreparable injury to permit avoidance of the abstention
doctrine, the Court reasoned that the inherent vagueness of the oath
prevents the oath-taker from determining what future conduct he
may permissibly engage in so as not to violate his oath and expose
himself to prosecution for perjury.29 Since this vagueness could
only be eliminated by "extensive adjudications, under the impact
of a variety of factual situations,"30 the Court did not abstain. More-
over, the Court noted that abstention delays adjudication on the
merits,3 1 "a result quite costly where the vagueness of a state statute
may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment Freedoms.
32
While the decision in Baggett rested primarily on a violation of
due process, the Dombrowski opinion emphasized the inappropriate-
ness of abstention where unconstitutional vagueness deters the
exercise of first amendment freedoms. The inhibiting effect of the
statutes on protected expression in Dombrowski was held to con-
stitute sufficient irreparable injury. The officers of SCEF could
not define the wide range of activities which might have been
prohibited by the statutes. They could thus be forced to refrain
from engaging in constitutionally protected activity to avert the
peril that their conduct might be within the vague terms of the
throw, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the
constitutional form of the government" by revolution, force, or violence. WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.81.010(5) (1951).
20 The state argued that "the oath does not offend due process because the vagaries
are contained in a promise of future conduct, the breach of which would not support
a conviction for perjury." 377 U.S. at 374. The Supreme Court reasoned that "even
if it can be said that a conviction for falsely taking this oath would not be sustained,
the possibility of a prosecution cannot be gainsaid. The State may not require one
to choose between subscribing to an unduly vague and broad oath, thereby incurring
the likelihood of prosecution, and conscientiously refusing to take the oath with
the consequent loss of employment .... " Ibid.
3Id. at 378. "[CGonstruction of the challenged terms, such as precept, example,
allegiance, institutions, and the like, in a declaratory judgment action . . . without
reference to concrete, particularized situations so necessary to bring into focus the
impact of the terms on constitutionally protected rights of speech and association"
probably could not have eliminated the vagueness from these terms. Ibid.
31See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 423
(1964) (concurring opinion). Unpopular minorities will usually seek to escape local
prejudice by asserting their rights in the federal district courts. Since that litigation
often involves construction of state statutes, city ordinances or state court decisions the
litigant is rechanneled to the state courts and "his journey there may be not only
weary and expensive but also long and drawn out. There will be no inclination to
expedite his case. The whole weight of the status quo will be on the side of delay
and procrastination." Id. at 435. For example, in Harrison, judgment on the merits
was reached almost seven years after the institution of the litigation.
3 377 U.S. at 379.
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statutes. Federal intervention was held warranted, even at the
expense of enjoining institution of a state criminal proceeding, 8
since the necessity of protecting first amendment rights was deemed
to outweigh the traditional considerations underlying abstention. 4
In Dombrowski, as in Baggett, the Court found that the vague-
ness of the statutes could not have been eliminated except by mul-
tiple prosecutions. 5 If the possibility of multiple prosecutions is
an indispensable factor in the finding of irreparable injury in Dom-
browski, as it was in Baggett, the scope of the Dombrowski decision
seems limited. Abstention would remain appropriate even though
a vague statute inhibits the exercise of protected expression, when-
ever a single state proceeding might provide an interpretation
which would eliminate the "chilling effect."3 6 On the other hand,
33 The dissenters argued that under the Court's decision, state prosecutions under
statutes challengeable for vagueness on first amendment grounds, "instituted after
the commencement of a federal action, must be halted until the prosecuting authorities
obtain in some other state proceeding a narrowing construction, which in turn would
presumably be subject to further monitoring by the federal courts before the state
prosecution would be allowed to proceed." 380 U.S. at 498-99. This result, they
asserted, would cause serious interference with state administration of its criminal
law.
Further, the dissenters point out that the decision subverts "considerations of
federalism" by making standing and criminality depend upon which party reaches
the forum of its choice first. In a state criminal prosecution, the defendant cannot
avoid a constitutional application of the statute to his conduct simply because the
statute may be unconstitutional as applied to others whose conduct is protected.
Id. at 501-02. See generally Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 96-104 (1960). On the other
hand, in a federal civil proceeding, a person may attack as void on its face an overly
broad statute regulating protected expression and does not have to demonstrate
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to his particular conduct so long as
he shows that the statute as construed would be unconstitutional in some possible
application. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Thus, since the
officers of SCEF had brought the federal action before the commencement of state
criminal proceedings, they immunized themselves "with a federal vaccination from
state prosecution" even though their conduct might have been constitutionally prose.
cuted under a narrow reading of the statute. 380 U.S. at 502.
3 This conclusion appears consistent with recent decisions of the federal courts
in related areas which reflect a growing concern with state court delay in vindicating
individual rights. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (motion picture
censorship scheme invalidated because not providing prompt judicial remedies);
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (prior exhaustion of state administra-
tive remedies not required in civil rights suits); Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1965) (prosecutorial harassment is ground for removal to federal court); United States
ex rel. LaNear v. LaVallee, 306 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1962) (exhaustion of state remedies
before issuance of habeas corpus limited). See also Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965).
88 380 U.S. at 491.
"Justices Black and White seem to adopt this view of the Dombrowski rationale
[Vol. 1966: 219
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the premium which the Court placed on first amendment Tights
may make abstention inappropriate, even if multiple state prose-
cutions are unnecessary. Abstention invariably delays the vindica-
tion of constitutional rights by forcing the litigant to go to the state
court and then, if necessary and desired by the plaintiff,37 return to
the federal court for judgment on the merits of the federal constitu-
tional issue.38
Although Dombrowski may be cited as following Baggett in
holding the necessity of multiple prosecutions an indispensable ad-
junct to the finding of irreparable injury, distinguishing factors
exist which suggest that Dombrowski has made greater inroads on
the abstention doctrine. First, in Baggett, unlike Dombrowski, the
federal court was not asked to enjoin an imminent criminal pro-
ceeding.3 9 In striking down the oath, the Court did not have to
interfere with the normal processes of state criminal law enforce-
ment and, thus, did not irritate a "most sensitive source of friction
in the subsequent case of Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742, 754 (1965) (per
curiam) (dissenting opinions). See note 56 infra.
37 If the federal issue is not avoided by state court construction of the challenged
statute "in light of the constitutional objections presented to the District Court,"
Government and Civic Employees Organization v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957),
the litigant may nevertheless return to the federal forum for final adjudication of
the federal issue. However, unless he "expressly reserved the right to return to the
federal tribunal," he is presumed to have submitted the federal question to the
state court for final adjudication. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Ex-
aminers, 375 U.S. 411, 428 (1964) (concurring opinion).
8 See note 31 supra.
" Several lower courts in deciding claims under the Civil Rights Act have held
state statutes unconstitutional. However, prosecutions in the state courts were not
pending under any of these statutes and enforcement thereunder was not imminent
as in Dombrowski. See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182
(E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961)
(enjoining enforcement of statutes passed to prevent school desegregation); Davis v.
Morrison, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 996 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 252 F.2d 102
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958) (enjoining enforcement of state laws
requiring segregated bus transportation); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.
Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (same as Davis); cf. Jordan v. Hutcheson,
323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963) (action to enjoin harassment of Negro attorneys by state
legislative committee).
,0 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951). In Dombrowski, state criminal
proceedings were imminent. Thus, the resultant potential disruption of state law
enforcement might provide a more justifiable basis for abstention. See Stefanelli
v. Minard, supra. Section 2283 does not technically prohibit federal injunction in
Dombrowski, since the federal action in the court below was commenced before the
state indictments were filed. However, it is arguable that the injunction violates
the spirit of § 2283, since at the time the federal suit was filed a search warrant had
been issued and documents subpoenaed to aid a grand jury in its investigation of
SCEF and its officers. Brief for Appellees, p. 46. On the other hand, "proceedings"
within § 2283 could be construed to refer only to trials actually commenced in the
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between State and Nation." 40 Second, in Baggett the state statute
expressly purported to require teachers to take the oath. Thus,
constitutional adjudication could not have been avoided by a
saving state court decision construing the statute to be inapplicable
to those teachers. The only question concerned the indefinite
requirements imposed on the teachers by the vague oath. Absten-
tion was deemed inappropriate since extensive adjudications would
have been necessary to define the range of activities falling within
its terms. In Dombrowski, however, constitutional adjudication
might have been avoided if the Supreme Court had upheld absten-
tion so as to allow state court construction of the statute in such a
manner that it could not in any circumstances apply to SCEF.41
Such a ruling by the state courts would have given SCEF no grounds
for otherwise challenging the statute.42 Failure to give state courts
this opportunity indicates further erosion of the traditional bases for
abstention determinative in Harrison.
However, while the scope of Baggett has arguably been ex-
panded, the deleterious effects on federal-state relations caused by
increasing the situations where federal injunctive relief is im-
mediately available may have been ameliorated by the Court's
unique use of the "void on its face" doctrine. Normally, the effect
of declaring a statute void on its face is to render it void from
its inception, thus barring all further action under it.43 While
state courts. The mere filing of the indictments by the state would not foreclose the
opportunity to bring federal proceedings. This position is supported on the grounds
that immediate vindication of first amendment rights should not depend on the
fortuitous circumstance of which party wins the race to the forum of his choice and
that interference with state judicial processes, unless the trial has commenced, is
not substantial enough to require abstention. See Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister:
Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend in
Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34 FoRDHAM L. REv. 71, 92-93 (1965).
" State court determination that the statutes were void as applied to certain con-
duct of SCEF would not have been sufficient to avoid federal constitutional adjudica-
tion. Normally, a finding that a statute is void as applied will not affect its enforce-
ability in other situations. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). There-
fore, such finding may not afford the basis for adequate relief from the continued
bad faith application of the statute in other contexts. In order to afford the ap-
propriate relief, a court might find it necessary to enjoin enforcement of the statute
in all situations, thus in effect holding the statute void on its face. Arguably, this is
the result reached by the Court in Dombrowski by holding the challenged statutes
void on their face until an acceptable limiting construction by the state courts is
rendered.
"IThe dissenters in Dombrowski asserted that such a limiting construction was
possible. They concluded from this that Dombrowski is indistinguishable from
Harrison and the bulk of the abstention cases. 380 U.S. at 500-01 n.3.
" See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) (dictum); Hague v. CIO,
807 U.S. 496, 518 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
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Dombrowski declares some statutory provisions void on their face,44
it indicates that the district court is to retain the power to modify
the injunction and "to permit prosecutions in light of subsequent
state court interpretation clarifying the application of a statute
to particular conduct." 45 The Court states that this might be ac-
complished only by means of a state "noncriminal proceeding. '46
Thus, a void on its face interpretation in the abstention context
appears to mean that the statutes are void until they are constitu-
tionally construed. In enabling state courts to construe state statutes
found void on their face, the Supreme Court thus ignores the normal
preclusive effect of such a holding, apparently in an effort to miti-
gate federal interference with legal administration.
The majority opinion suggests several other plausible interpre-
tations which cast doubt upon its precedential effect. The Court
additionally considered a decision on the merits compelled where
''statutes are justifiably attacked . . . as applied for the purpose of
discouraging protected activity."47 Broadly interpreted to encom-
pass all federally guaranteed rights, this language would eliminate
the requirement of judicial restraint in most cases where abstention
has been traditionally applied.48  However, the Court may limit
this approach to the situation where state officials have demonstrated
bad faith in enforcing state statutes without any expectation of con-
viction but rather as part of a plan to discourage the exercise of pro-
"See note 10 supra.
"380 U.S. at 492. The Court indicated that the statutes could be constitutionally
construed to apply to certain "hard-core" conduct. Id. at 491-92. Furthermore, "once
an acceptable limiting construction is obtained, it may be applied to conduct occur-
ring prior to the construction." Id. at 491 n.7. This approach might render less
cogent the objection raised by the dissenters that the decision permits abuses by
persons who, considering state prosecution imminent, file suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief in a federal court where the constitutionality of the state statute
need not be measured by its application to his individual conduct. See note 33 supra.
While such action might afford delay in a state prosecution, if the conduct can con-
stitutionally be prohibited the state can resume prosecution after a proper narrowing
construction has been rendered in a separate state proceeding.
46 380 U.S. at 491.
The Court recognized that Louisiana and thirty-six other states have adopted the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Id. at 491 n.6. LA. Cxv. PRoc. CODE arts. 1871-83
(1960). It apparently was assumed by the Court that this noncriminal procedure would
be available for the purpose of a narrowing construction. See generally 1 ANDERSON,
AcnONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 18 (1951, Supp. 1959). Other states have
declaratory judgment statutes which are restricted to litigation of specified issues.
See id. at § 6.
,7 380 U.S. at 489-90.
48 E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943).
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tected activity, thus stating a claim under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act.49 Under these circumstances, any requirement that the
state courts be given an initial opportunity to interpret the statutes
is immaterial since even if the statutes were found unconstitutional
as applied, the harassment by state officials might continue. There-
fore, while this good-faith qualification might find support in the
language used in prior abstention casesaO and seemingly provides
an alternate rationale for the decision, the contours of its applica-
bility are left unanswered by the Court.
It may also be argued that the decision implies that Congress,
in passing the Civil Rights Act, has provided a federal forum to
protect certain federal rights against nullification by the states and
thereby has made the exercise of federal jurisdiction mandatory in
cases which state a claim under the Act.51 Dombrowski, in directing
the district court to reach a judgment on the merits of the claim
40 "If these allegations state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
as we believe they do . . . the interpretation ultimately put on the statutes by the
state courts is irrelevant." 380 U.S. at 490.
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides civil relief against
"every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ... .
oFor example, in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), the plaintiffs
had not shown that they had "been threatened with any injury other than that inci-
dental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Id. at 164.
(Emphasis added.)
The practice by the abstaining federal court of retaining jurisdiction and exacting
assurances from state officials that the challenged statutes would not be enforced
against the litigants for "activities engaged in during the full pendency of this litiga-
tion," 360 U.S. at 179, also may indicate a desire to protect against bad faith pro-
ceedings. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
11 This view was advanced by the dissenters in Harrison. 360 U.S. at 179. Mr.
Justice Douglas argued that the district court should not have abstained "if the ap.
pellees, who invoked that court's jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, proved
their charge that the appellants, under the color of the Virginia statutes, had deprived
them of civil rights secured by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 181.
The importance of relating allegations of irreparable injury to violation of the
Civil Rights Act, Rv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) is accentuated when
state criminal prosecutions have commenced. Actions brought under the Civil Rights
Act may come within the "expressly authorized" exception to the federal anti-
injunction statute which prohibits federal court intervention into state prosecutions
which have already been instituted. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). Compare Cooper v.
Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950), with Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d
579 (4th Cir. 1964), 1965 DuKE L.J. 813.
The Court in Dombrowski found that no state proceedings were pending within
the meaning of § 2283 even though indictments had been returned by a grand
jury because SCEF's complaint, erroneously dismissed by the district court, was filed
before the state indictments were filed. Thus, the Supreme Court considered it
"unnecessary to resolve the question whether suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958 ed.)
come under the 'expressly authorized' exception to § 2283." 380 U.S. at 484 n.2.
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stated under section 1983 of the Act, suggests that a federal forum
might be immediately available for the trial of any section 1983
claim.52
Mr. Justice White rejected this reading of Dombrowski by
arguing in a subsequent case 5 that Dombrowski allows a federal
court to enjoin a "planned prosecutorial misuse" of an otherwise
valid state statute since in that situation "it is obvious that defense
in a state criminal prosecution will not suffice to avoid irreparable
injury."0' 4 This interpretation, while explaining the "as applied"
language55 of the majority in Dombrowski, limits the availability of
immediate federal trial on the merits in the absence of a vagueness
challenge"6 to allegations stating a substantial charge of such a
groundless prosecution. 57
" On the facts of Dombrowski, the federal forum would be immediately available
at least where the petitioner attacks the good faith of the state prosecuting officials.
In fact, the Court relied on the bad faith factor in finding that no construction of the
statute by a state court would insure a cessation of prosecutorial abuses. Id. at 490.
Thus, the Court may not deem abstention inappropriate in all cases where a claim is
brought under the Civil Rights Act.
5 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 754 (1965) (per curiam) (dissenting opinion).
51 Id. at 755. The majority in a per curiam opinion had vacated a district court de-
cision which refused to enjoin enforcement of a Mississippi anti-picketing statute.
The statute had been challenged both on its face as an unconstitutionally broad regu-
lation of speech and as applied for the purpose of discouraging civil rights activities.
The cause was remanded to the district court for a determination of statutory validity
in light of the Dombrowski decision. The district court had held the statute consti-
tutional on its face, and further determined that it was not being applied to harass
the petitioners in the exercise of their constitutional rights. Justice Black, joined by
Justices Harlan and Stewart in dissent, interposed the objection that the majority
of the Court in remanding the case apparently meant to indicate that Dombrowski
"created a new rule authorizing federal courts to enjoin state officers from enforcing
state laws even though clearly and narrowly drawn" within the state's constitutional
power to regulate picketing. Id. at 747.
"See text accompanying note 47 supra.
G' Mr. Justice White also believes that Dombrowski does not make abstention in-
appropriate in all cases where a statute is attacked as void on its face as violative
of the first and fourteenth amendments but only where it is challenged as a vague
regulation of freedom of expression and is not subject to "clarifying construction under
the impact of one case." 381 U.S. at 756.
7 In Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965), the Fifth Circuit relied on
Dombrowski to support its belief that a "civil complaint asserting such an abuse of the
prosecutorial function would state a claim under the Civil Rights Act ... and justify
injunctive relief." Id. at 752. Here the state, in order to harass the activities of a
civil rights leader, had renewed criminal charges for conduct which the Supreme Court
had decided on the merits was not a violation of the state law. The district court
recognized that federal courts should not interfere with state court enforcement of local
laws. However, if "a State, under the pretext of preserving law and order uses local
laws, valid on their face, to harass or punish citizens for the exercise of their consti-
tutional rights or federally protected statutory rights, the general principle must yield
to the exception: the federal system is imperiled." Ibid.
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In the same case, Mr. Justice Black, joined by two other dis-
senters, argued that Dombrowski requires still another interpreta-
tion. He reads the case as permitting avoidance of the abstention
doctrine only where the state statutes are found unconstitutionally
vague on their face. This interpretation does not permit the enforce-
ment of a statute to be enjoined for unconstitutionality as applied.
Rather, Justice Black argues that a showing of bad faith conduct on
the part of state law enforcement officers which is aimed at harass-
ment and holds no hope of ultimate success, permits a federal
injunction directed only against the continued objectionable acts. 8
Apparently, under this interpretation abstention would prevent the
federal courts from enjoining all enforcement of state statutes valid
on their face even when state officers act unlawfully in enforcing
such statutes.
Despite the ambiguities inherent in the decision, by limiting the
traditional use of abstention Dombrowski represents a clear attempt
to reach an accommodation between the interest of protecting first
amendment rights and the interest of avoiding interference with
state administration of its criminal law by holding that statutes void
on their face are not necessarily void in perpetuo. Thus, the federal
judgment on the merits will protect free expression from the inhibit-
ing effects of vague statutes or the harassment of state prosecutorial
abuses without denying the state courts an opportunity to save the
statutes by subsequently rendering a constitutional interpretation of
them or to continue good faith enforcement of valid statutes.
68 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748-49, 752 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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